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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Gabbrielle
Aberasturi’s motion to suppress evidence.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At approximately 2:20 a.m. Officer Viens noticed a suspicious person in
an alleyway dumpster. (Tr., p. 30, L. 14 – p. 31, L. 6; p. 32, Ls. 16-23; p. 33, L.
10 – p. 34, L. 7.) Officer Viens made contact with that person, later identified as
Aberasturi, who was “dumpster diving” for discarded items to resell. (Tr., p. 11,
Ls. 4-17; p. 34, L. 25 – p. 35, L. 8.) The alley was familiar to Viens because it
was “a known place to officers that work that shift for criminal activity.” (Tr., p.
36, L. 9-16.) Officer Viens also made contact with an acquaintance of Aberasturi
who was sitting inside her car nearby. (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 21-24; p. 32, Ls. 6-13.)
Officer Viens told Aberasturi to get out of the dumpster and informed her
she was being detained for disorderly conduct. (Tr., p. 31, L. 12 – p. 32, L. 13; p.
36, Ls. 17-22; p. 37, Ls. 5-8.) Aberasturi was cooperative, and not placed under
arrest, but was not free to leave. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 9-13; p. 48, Ls. 13-15.)
In less than two minutes Officer Hoffman responded to the scene. (Tr., p.
35, L. 25 – p. 36, L. 4.) Officer Viens verbally identified Aberasturi, asked her to
“sit tight for a second,” and returned to his patrol car to run both suspects’
information through dispatch. (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 4-8; p. 37, L. 17 – p. 38, L. 1; p. 48,
Ls. 2-9; Defense Ex. 1, 01:51.)

While Officer Viens ran their information,
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confirming identifies and checking for warrants, Officer Hoffman kept an eye on
the suspects. (Tr., p. 31, Ls. 7-11; p. 38, Ls. 8-23; p. 39, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 9.)
Approximately four minutes after initial contact was made, Officer Plaisted
was the third officer to arrive on scene. (Tr., p. 38, L. 24 – p. 39, L. 11.) Officer
Viens was still sitting in his car running the suspects’ information. (Tr., p. 39, L. 3
– p. 40, L. 9; p. 52, Ls. 4-11.) While Officer Viens did that, Officer Plaisted made
contact with Aberasturi.

(Tr., p. 40, Ls. 10-15; p. 67, L. 13 – 68, L. 1.) Officer

Plaisted testified that he “briefly spoke” to Aberasturi, and that after he asked if
he “could have consent to search her car,” that “[s]he said I could.” (Tr., p. 68, L.
15 – p. 69, L. 5.) Officer Viens affirmed that “sometime between me running [the
suspects] through dispatch and then me going back and speaking [to] them,” that
he overheard the conversation between Aberasturi and Officer Plaisted. (Tr., p.
41, L. 9 – p. 42, L. 12.) Officer Viens testified that “I heard [Aberasturi] give him
1
consent to search her vehicle.” (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 13-14.)

After Aberasturi consented to the search of her vehicle, Officer Plaisted
ran his K-9 around her vehicle. (Tr., p. 69, L. 12 – p. 71, L. 4.) The K-9 alerted
on the vehicle.

(Tr., p. 71, Ls. 5-24.)

Prior to that alert, Officer Viens had

returned to speak with Aberasturi regarding the dumpster diving. (Tr., p. 42, L.
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Aberasturi disputed below that she consented to the search of her vehicle. (Tr.,
p. 10, L. 21 – p. 11, L. 3.) However, the court concluded that while the consent
was not captured on audio, it found the officers’ testimony about the consent was
credible. (R., p. 125.) This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in
the record. (See Tr., p. 40, Ls. 13-18; p. 41, Ls. 9-24; p. 48, L. 23 - p. 49, L. 4;
p. 69, Ls. 6-15; p. 79, Ls. 13-17; p. 80, Ls. 8-11.)
2

21 – p. 43, L. 17; p. 56, Ls. 21-24.) Before Officer Viens concluded his warning
to Aberasturi, Officer Plaisted notified him that the K-9 had alerted. (Tr., p. 43,
Ls. 18-25; p. 71, L. 22 – p. 73, L. 18.) For the second time that night, Officer
Viens told Aberasturi to “sit tight” and proceeded to search the vehicle with
Officer Plaisted. (Tr., p. 74, Ls. 17-22; Defense Ex. 1, 11:36.) The officers found
methamphetamine inside it. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 5-18.)
Aberasturi moved to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle. (R.,
pp. 63-65, 77-86, 94-102.) The district court granted her motion, concluding that
the detention of Aberasturi was unreasonably extended. (R., pp. 121-132.)
The state timely appealed. (R., pp. 135-38.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err by concluding that Aberasturi’s detention was
unreasonably extended?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Concluding That Aberasturi’s Detention
Unreasonably Extended The Investigation
A.

Introduction
Aberasturi moved the district court for an order suppressing the evidence

found in her vehicle. The court granted that motion, finding that it was unclear
whether the K-9 alerted on Aberasturi’s car prior to the end of the warning
conversation for disorderly conduct. (R., pp. 129-30.) This was significant to the
court because “[i]f [K-9] Geno had sat and refused to move after Officer Viens
concluded his conversation with Defendant, there was no probable cause for the
search before the detention became unreasonable.”

(R., p. 130 (emphasis

added).) The court concluded that the state “failed to meet its burden of proof
that probable cause to search Defendant’s automobile was developed before the
purpose of the investigative stop had been fulfilled”—that is, before the warning
conversation between Aberasturi and Officer Viens was concluded with his
second instruction to “sit tight.” (See R., p. 130.) The district court therefore
found that Aberasturi’s detention had been unreasonably extended, and
suppressed the evidence found in her vehicle. (R., pp. 128-31.)
However, application of the legal standards to the facts shows this
evidence should not have been suppressed. When Aberasturi was instructed to
“sit tight” a second time the K-9 had already alerted on her vehicle; thus, any
prolonged detention would have been lawful. Additionally, the district court erred
by requiring probable cause, as opposed to reasonable suspicion, to justify
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extending the stop. Application of the correct legal standard to the facts found
shows reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard.

State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). When a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial
court’s findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. Id.
C.

The District Court Clearly Erred By Determining That Aberasturi’s
Detention Was Prolonged Beyond The Original Investigation, Because
Before Aberasturi Was Told To “Sit Tight” A Second Time, Officer Viens
Had Already Been Notified That The K-9 Had Alerted On Aberasturi’s
Vehicle
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. A police officer may detain a person for the purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior “if there is an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76, 996
P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d
520, 522 (1992)). Such a detention “is permissible if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or
is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,
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983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its inception, but
must also be carried out in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and
duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004). “The
purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is
initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop.” Sheldon, 139
Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224.
Law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully
stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does not
prolong the detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142
Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 2005). “When a reliable
drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor
of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are
drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant.”

State v.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005)). “If
probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of the
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search.” State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App.
2000).
Ruling on Aberasturi’s motion, the district court found the following facts:
Officer Viens appeared on the scene at approximately 2:20 am. 2 (R., p. 125; Tr.,
p. 34, Ls. 19-24.) The alleyway was in a known high-crime area, and Officer
Viens suspected a violation of Boise City Code § 6-01-05(B), Disorderly
3
Conduct. (R., pp. 125-26; Tr., p. 31, L. 12 – p. 32, L. 1; p. 36, Ls. 9-16.) Officer

2

The district court calculated relevant timelines by relying on the officers’
testimony, the CAD dispatch printout admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit
10, and Officer Hoffman’s audio of the incident admitted into evidence as
Defense Exhibit 1. (See R., p. 124.) The district court explained its methodology
and conclusions:
Officer Hoffman was the second to arrive on the scene. His audio
recording is time stamped as to duration. That is, the recording
shows the passage of time in seconds as the recording plays.
Based upon the elapsed time from the commencement of the
recording and the point at which the conversation between Officer
Viens and the Defendant become[s] audible, the Court finds that
Officer Hoffman commenced his audio recording upon exiting his
patrol vehicle. By comparing known events on Officer Hoffman’s
recording with events reflected in the Incident History, the Court is
able to reconstruct a chronology of events. The time stamp on the
Incident History is given in seconds so the Court’s chronology is
also given in seconds. The actual time of events may be off by a
few seconds depending on the exact time that Officer Hoffman
commenced his recording, but the relative lapse of time is
accurate.
(R., p. 124.)
3

The district court cited to Section 6-01-05 of the Boise City Code, Disorderly
Conduct:
Any person who violates the provisions below is guilty of a
misdemeanor:
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Viens told Aberasturi to “sit tight for a second” at 2:23:40, at which point he went
to his patrol car to run her information through dispatch. (R., p. 126; Tr., p. 37, L.
17 – p. 38, L. 7; Defense Ex. 1, 01:51.) Officer Plaisted arrived on scene with his
K-9 at 2:24:44 (R., pp. 126-27; Tr., p. 38, L. 24 – p. 39, L. 18; p. 66, Ls. 17-23),
and spoke with Aberasturi at 2:28:34. (R., p. 127; Tr., p. 66, L. 17 – p. 68, L. 17;
Defense Ex. 1, 06:37.) Both officers testified that Aberasturi consented to a
search of her vehicle.4 (R., p. 127; Tr., p. 40, Ls. 10-18; p. 41, Ls. 9-24; p. 48, L.

A. Occupying, lodging or sleeping in any building, structure or
place, whether public or private, or in any motor vehicle without the
permission of the owner or person entitled to possession or in
control thereof; or
B. Loitering, prowling or wandering upon the private property of
another, without lawful business, permission or invitation by the
owner or the lawful occupants thereof; or
C. Loitering or remaining in or about school grounds or buildings,
without having any reason or relationship involving custody of or
responsibility for a pupil or student, school authorized functions,
activities or use.
D. Law enforcement officers shall not enforce subsection A above
(disorderly conduct ordinance), when the individual is on public
property and there is no available overnight shelter. The term
“available overnight shelter” is a public or private shelter, with an
available overnight space, open to an individual or family unit
experiencing homelessness at no charge. If the individual cannot
utilize the overnight shelter space due to voluntary actions such as
intoxication, drug use, unruly behavior, or violation of shelter rules,
the overnight shelter space shall still be considered available.
(Available at http://cityclerk.cityofboise.org/media/223588/0601.pdf.)
(R., p. 126.)
It is clear that Aberasturi’s consent would have justified the search of her
vehicle. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003);
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). However, that does
not resolve the relevant question on appeal—whether a detention of Aberasturi
with a second instruction to “sit tight” would also be justified.
4
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23 – 49, L.1; p. 68, L. 18 – p. 69, L.5.) By approximately 2:30:15, Officer Viens
had concluded running Aberasturi’s information, and can be heard having a
discussion with Aberasturi regarding disorderly conduct, warning her that it would
be prudent to obtain written permission from storeowners before dumpster diving
again. (R., pp. 127-28; Tr., p. 43, Ls. 7-17; Defense Ex. 1, 08:16-11:36.) The
district court found that at some point Officer Plaisted had retrieved his K-9
“Geno” to conduct an exterior sniff of Aberasturi’s vehicle. (R., p. 128; Tr., pp.
69-71.) Lastly, the court found that the warning conversation between Aberasturi
and Officer Viens concluded at around 2:33:55. (R., pp. 127-128; Defense Ex. 1,
11:36.)

The incident audio reveals that the conversation ended with another

instruction from Officer Viens to “sit tight.” (Defense Ex. 1, 11:36.)
The issue on appeal, as phrased by the district court, is that “[i]f Geno had
sat and refused to move after Officer Viens concluded his conversation with
Defendant, there was no probable cause for the search before the detention
became unreasonable.” (R., p. 130.) The court found that because “the exact
time [that Geno alerted] cannot be determined,” the state had failed to prove the
detention was lawfully extended. (R., pp. 129-31.)
However, the district court clearly erred when it concluded the state failed
to prove whether the K-9 alert happened before the end of the conversation
between Aberasturi and Officer Viens. (See R., pp. 129-30.) First, as to the
timing of the K-9 alert and subsequent notification, the record reveals that the
K-9 alert occurred before Officer Viens ever concluded his original investigation.
Officer Viens testified as follows:
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Q. Okay. And while you’re having this discussion with her
about the disorderly conduct violation, does Officer Plaisted
get your attention.
A. Yes.
Q. And what is that for?
A. To let me know that his dog alerted on the vehicle.
(Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25 (emphasis added).) The district court affirmed that this
officer-to-officer notification happened before the conversation between Officer
Viens and Aberasturi concluded—it found that “[t]he Court realizes that Officer
Viens testified that he became aware during his conversation with Defendant,
that Officer Plaisted signaled that something was going on with the dog and the
vehicle.” (R., p. 130 (emphasis added).)
The only remaining question is what the officer-to-officer notification
signified.

The district court concluded the notification related to the K-9’s

activities, but also found “[w]hether [the notification from Officer Plaisted]
occurred as Geno was showing interest in the window or after he sat and refused
to move is unknown.” (R., p. 130.) In other words, the court felt it could not
determine whether the K-9 alert came before the notification, and therefore,
came before the instruction that Aberasturi “sit tight.” However, Officer Viens’
and Officer Plaisted’s testimony make it plain that the notification came after the
dog alerted. First, as set forth above, Officer Viens testified the notification was
“[t]o let me know that his dog alerted on the vehicle.” (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 24-25.)
Second, Officer Plaisted testified:
A. So he’s—he’s sat down. He’s alerted to the car. I now have
probable cause to search this car.
11

I open up the passenger door. He immediately flies into the car,
goes right to the center console area of the vehicle, again starts
sniffing around the center console….
Q. Okay. And so after he does that, what do you do next?
A. I pull him out of the car, I lifted up the center console, looked in,
and saw a package of Marlboro cigarettes. And I opened that
up, looked in, and I believe I saw a plastic baggie with some
white powder in it which I believed to be methamphetamine at
that point. I, then, left the car, shut the door to go put my
dog back in the car, in my patrol car, and notified Officer
Viens of the alert and specific areas that we needed to
search.
(Tr., p. 71, L. 22 – p. 73, L. 1 (emphasis added).)
Q. So when your dog alerted and you let him inside the car—
A. Right.
Q. —and he showed interest in the center console and so then you
searched and found that, did you at this time search the entirety of
the car?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Okay. That’s when you closed the door, put the dog back,
and then alerted Officer Viens?
A. Yes, ma’am.
(Tr., p. 73, Ls. 8-18 (emphasis added).)

This evidence shows that the

notification followed the alert, and pertained to the alert.

Moreover, the

testimony shows that the K-9 gave its alert establishing probable cause—and
Officer Plaisted notified Officer Viens of the same—before Officer Viens
concluded his original investigation with a warning. Thus, the evidence clearly
establishes that by the time Officer Viens issued his second “sit tight” instruction
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to

Aberasturi,

the

K-9

alert—and

methamphetamine—had already occurred.

the

discovery

of

suspected

5

Applying the law to these facts shows the detention was lawful from
beginning to end: Officer Viens arrived on the scene at approximately 2:20 a.m.,
made contact with Aberasturi, and in four to five minutes was returning to his car
to run her information through dispatch to check for warrants. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 1-4;
p. 39, Ls. 4-11.) This initial detention, for suspicion of violating the Boise city
code, was lawful. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. (See R., p. 128.)
Running Aberasturi’s information through dispatch was likewise a reasonable
extension of this investigation. See Roe, 140 Idaho at 181–82, 90 P.3d at 931–
32; see also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015). Less
than three minutes later Officer Viens finished running her information. (Tr., p.
42, Ls. 13-16; State’s Ex. 10.) He returned to speak with Aberasturi, and instead
of issuing her a citation, he began giving her a verbal warning that cautioned her
to obtain written permission before she went dumpster diving again. (Tr., p. 43,
Ls. 7-17.)
Based on the incident audio the dumpster diving discussion was taking
place at around 2:30:35, which means that in less than eleven minutes Officer

5

The incident audio reflects that this account is correct: one can hear Officer
Viens’ discussion with Aberasturi beginning somewhere after 8:16, becoming
more audible around 8:38, and persisting until 11:36. (Defense Ex. 1.) To the
extent it can be heard, the conversation never strays from or prolongs beyond
the topic of the initial detention—Aberasturi’s disorderly conduct—and Officer
Viens ends his warnings regarding future dumpster diving with an abrupt
instruction to “sit tight.” (Defense Ex. 1, 08:16-11:36.) Based on the officers’
testimony this would have been the point at which the officers searched the
vehicle. (See Tr., p. 74, Ls. 17-22.)
13

Viens was wrapping up the investigation with his warning. (See Defense Exhibit
1, 8:38; see also State’s Ex. 10 (showing Officer Viens arriving at approximately
one minute and twenty-eight seconds before the incident audio began, thus
placing the warning discussion at approximately 2:30:35).)

Before this

conversation concluded, Officer Plaisted notified Officer Viens that his K-9
alerted on Aberasturi’s vehicle. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 72, L. 15 – p. 73, L.1; p.
73, Ls. 8-18.)

This alert established not only reasonable suspicion for the

continued detention of Aberasturi—now a suspect in a narcotics investigation—
but probable cause to search her vehicle. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88
P.3d at 1224; see also Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148. Thus,
the second instruction to “sit tight” was now a wholly reasonable detention in a
lawfully expanded investigation.
The district court was mistaken in finding that “the exact time [of the K-9
alert] cannot be determined,” and mistaken in finding the state did not prove the
K-9 alert occurred before the original investigation was over. (R., p. 129-30.)
Here, the facts in the record show that the K-9 alerted, and Officer Plaisted
notified Officer Viens of the alert, before that initial investigation ever concluded.
The district court’s suppression of the evidence found in the vehicle was
therefore incorrectly premised on a clearly erroneous reading of the facts.
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D.

The District Court Erred By Determining That There Was Insufficient
Probable Cause To Detain Aberasturi; The State Only Needed
Reasonable Suspicion To Further Detain Aberasturi, Which Was
Established By The K-9 Showing Interest In Aberasturi’s Vehicle
Alternatively, even if the district court correctly determined that the timing

of the K-9 alert or significance of the officer-to-officer notification is unclear, it still
erred by applying the probable cause rather than the reasonable suspicion
standard to the extended detention.

Even if Officer Plaisted’s notification

signified only that his K-9 was “showing interest” in the vehicle as stated by the
district court, this would have still provided reasonable suspicion justifying an
extended detention of Aberasturi.
Here, Officer Plaisted’s K-9 was trained to detect the odors of illegal
narcotics. (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 15-19.) Aberasturi made no objection to the training of
the officer or the K-9. (See Tr., p. 62, L. 6 – p. 65, L. 18.) Officer Plaisted
testified that he walked his K-9 around Aberasturi’s vehicle:
So, again, I’m just taking Geno for just a casual walk, is what it is. It
wasn’t until we got to the passenger’s side of this vehicle that that
casual walk turned into something more.
I saw Geno do a head snap which is—you know, typically his head
is kind of down facing forward. And all of a sudden it snaps to the
left, which draws my attention. And now he’s beginning to sniff the
odors that are coming out of this car. Geno starts doing what’s
called a bracketing behavior, which he’s sniffing both left to right.
He approaches I believe it was the front passenger door. I saw that
the window on the passenger door was rolled down slightly. Geno
lifts his head up in the air, places his front paws on the door of the
windowsill itself, and he attempted to stretch his body to get his
nose closer to the gap in the window to sniff. And then after he did
that, he took his paws off the door and then sat down.
(Tr., p. 70, L. 8 – p. 71, L. 4.)
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The district court stated multiple times that Aberasturi’s continued
detention was not justified by probable cause. It explained that “[i]f Geno had sat
and refused to move after Officer Viens concluded his conversation with
Defendant, there was no probable cause for the search before the detention
became unreasonable.” (R., p. 130 (emphasis added).) The court went on:
“[b]ecause the State failed to meet its burden of proof that probable cause to
search the Defendant’s automobile was developed before the purpose of the
investigative stop had been fulfilled, the Court determines the search was
unreasonable.” (R., p. 130 (emphasis added).)
The district court erred as a matter of law by concluding the officers
needed probable cause to detain Aberasturi.

The officers only needed

reasonable suspicion of a different criminal activity to detain Aberasturi beyond
the conclusion of the original investigation. See, e.g., Sheldon, 139 Idaho at
984, 88 P.3d at 1224.
Application of the correct legal standard to the facts found by the district
court shows reasonable suspicion of drug activities justified continuing the
detention.

The district court stated that “[w]hether the [officer-to-officer

notification] occurred as Geno was showing interest in the window or after he sat
and refused to move is unknown.”

(R., p. 130.)

Even if one assumes the

notification from Officer Plaisted signified that the K-9 was only “showing interest”
in the window, this still means that Officer Viens was notified that a drugdetecting K-9, handled by a state-certified K-9 handler, was snapping his head,
sniffing odors, exhibiting bracketing behavior, and “plac[ing] his front paws on
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the door” of Aberasturi’s car in an attempt to get his nose close to the window
gap to sniff. (Tr., p. 63, L. 15 – p. 64, L. 19; p. 70, L. 8 – p. 71, L. 4.) Even if
insufficient to show probable cause, the drug-detecting K-9’s increasing interest
in Aberasturi’s vehicle still provided reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Thus,
even granting the district court’s finding that perhaps Officer Plaisted’s
notification did not pertain to the alert, but merely referred to the bracketing
behavior preceding the alert, Officer Viens would have nevertheless had
reasonable suspicion to prolong Aberasturi’s detention.

6

The district court incorrectly concluded that a lack of probable cause, as
opposed to reasonable suspicion, invalidated Aberasturi’s detention. Under the
correct standard, even adopting the district court’s factual findings, there was
reasonable suspicion for a prolonged detention. The court accordingly erred in
suppressing the evidence that was ultimately found.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s
order granting Aberasturi’s suppression motion and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of November, 2016.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans_______
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

Following the detention, the subsequent search itself would have plainly been
justified by Aberasturi’s consent, or the K-9 alert establishing probable cause.
See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; see also Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873,
172 P.3d at 1148.
6
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